PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT-STATEOF-THE-ART EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS

IN DESIGN DEFECT CASES--O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169,

463 A.2d 298 (1983).
The modern law of products liability reflects the ongoing efforts
of courts and legislatures to balance the competing interests of consumers and producers.' Established public policy favors compensating injured consumers; countervailing policy, however, rejects the
imposition of an insurer's liability upon sellers for every injury suffered through the use of their products.2 As a result, the courts generally have disavowed any intention of imposing such absolute
liability and have required that a product be either defectively
designed or manufactured before holding a manufacturer or distributor responsible for injuries sustained by a consumer.' Recently, in
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,4 the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a
test for determining whether a product has been defectively designed.
While refusing to advocate the imposition of absolute liability on
manufacturers of defectively designed products, the court nevertheless effectively removed the judicially created safeguards which theretofore had shielded the manufacturer from such liability.'
I For a survey of state legislation dealing with products liability see W. DREIR & H.
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
app. B (1983).
GOLDMANN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN NEW JERSEY:

2 Birnbaum, Unmasking the Testfor Design Defect: From Neglgence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1980). According to Professor

Birnbaum:
Underlying the whole body of tort law is an awareness that the need for
compensation, alone, is not a sufficient basis for an award ....
An award is
not to be made unless there exists some reason other than the mere need of
the victim for compensation. Otherwise, the award will be an arbitrary
shifting of loss from one person to another at a net loss to society due to the
economic and sociological costs of adjudication.
Id. at 601 (quoting P. KEETON &J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM 242 (1965)). Responding to the need for compensation alone would require
manufacturers and distributors to answer for any and all injuries resulting from the use
of their products, thus imposing an "insurer's liability."
3 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Birnbaum,
supra note 2, at 600 n.32 (1982); cf.Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J.
177, 185, 199 A.2d 826, 831 (1964) (manufacturer not under duty to furnish tools that
will not wear out); Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 543, 182 A.2d 545,
554 (1962) (warranty of merchantability does not require perfection).
4 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
5 Id at 192, 463 A.2d at 310 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting). In his concurring and dissenting opinion Justice Schreiber asserted that the majority had designed
a test for absolute rather than strict liability. Id It is perhaps more accurate to observe
that although the majority's test theoretically distinguishes itself from absolute liability,
the test is so expansive that, as a practical matter, sellers will face potential and unpre-
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In 1971, Arthur Henry bought a pool manufactured by the
Muskin Corporation from Kiddie City, Inc.6 Assembled, the pool
consisted of a twenty foot by twenty-four foot oval frame with four
foot walls.7 Within that frame, an embossed vinyl liner rested on a
shallow bed of sand.8 The water level in the filled pool was approximately three and one-half feet.9 The manufacturer provided a warning against diving, which was written in half-inch high letters, on the
outer wall of the pool.'°
On May 17, 1974, twenty-three year old Gary O'Brien visited
the Henry home uninvited." He dove into their pool with his arms
extended.' 2 His hands slid apart when they contacted the vinyl liner,
13
his head struck the bottom, and he was seriously injured.
O'Brien sued both Muskin and Kiddie City. 4 He alleged that
the pool was defective in design and that the defendants were strictly
liable for his injuries."' He traced the defect to the slipperiness of the
vinyl liner and the inadequacy of the manufacturer's warning.6
Conflicting testimony was presented at trial concerning the suitdictable liability for almost any injury related to product use. See infra notes 170-83 and
accompanying text.
6 O'Bren, 94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 362. Henry died prior to the time of the
accident involved herein. Id at 176, 463 A.2d at 301. His widow and estate were named
as third-party defendants in the lawsuit. Id Hereinafter, all reference to "the Henrys"
is to the widow and the estate.
7 Id at 177, 463 A.2d at 302.
8

Id

9 Id
10 Id

at 177-78, 463 A.2d at 302.
11 Id at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
12 Id. It was unclear from the record whether O'Brien dove from the pool platform or
from the roof of an adjacent garage. Id
13 Id
14 Id. at 176, 463 A.2d at 301. The manufacturer and distributor each filed crossclaims for contribution and indemnification against the other. Kiddie City filed a thirdparty complaint against the Henrys, and Muskin cross-claimed. Id Prior to trial, the
claims against Kiddie City were dismissed by consent of the parties upon "the assumption that Kiddie City did not manufacture the vinyl liner and that it was merely a
conduit between the manufacturer and the purchaser." Id at 188, 463 A.2d at 307. The
dismissal was not mandated by law. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600,
258 A.2d 697, 704-05 (1969) (distributor strictly liable for sale of defective product despite non-participation in manufacture and design); cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 406, 161 A.2d 69, 96 (1960) (car dealer liable on implied warranty
of merchantability for injury due to manufacturer's flaw). The appellate division reversed the voluntary dismissal. O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302. The supreme
court reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the claims against Kiddie City. Id at 188,
463 A.2d at 308.
15 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
16 Id.
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ability of vinyl as a pool liner.' 7 Muskin's expert testified that vinyl
was the best material with which to line an above-ground pool. 8 He
stated that the slipperiness of the liner allowed a diver's hands to
glide along it, thereby preventing his head from striking the pool bottom.19 Muskin's customer service manager, however, testified that a
thicker vinyl bottom with a deeper embossing could have been
used.2 o
At the close of the trial, the judge removed the issue of design
defect from the jury's consideration, limiting the scope of its deliberations to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warnings.2 ' In response
to special interrogatories the jury found that, because the warnings
were inadequate, the pool "was not reasonably fit, suitable and safe
for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes ' 22 when manufactured and that that defect was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. 23 The
jury also determined that O'Brien had been a trespasser at the time
of the accident 24 and that his injuries were eighty-five percent attributable to his own negligence. 25 The trial court then molded the verdict in accordance with New Jersey's comparative negligence
statute26 and barred the plaintiff from recovery.2 7
The appellate division held that the trial court erred in removId. at 178-79, 463 A.2d at 302-03.
18 Id., 463 A.2d at 303.
19 Id.
20 Id at 179, 463 A.2d at 303. The supreme court concluded that "(a] fair inference
could be drawn that deeper embossing would have rendered the pool bottom less slippery." Id
21 Id The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima
facie case on the issue of design defect. Id. at 176, 463 A.2d at 301.
22 Id
23 Id, 463 A.2d at 301-02.
24 Id, 463 A.2d at 302. O'Brien's trespasser status served to exculpate the Henrys.
See generally Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 461-63, 435 A.2d 540, 553-54 (1981)
(discussing landowner's common law duty to trespassers); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 (4th ed. 1971) (landowner not liable for trespasser's injury
despite lack of reasonable care to put land in safe condition). Both the appellate division and the supreme court agreed that O'Brien's status need not be relitigated. O'Brien,
94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302.
25 O'Bnen, 94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The statute provides
17

that:

Id

[c]ontributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action. . . to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if
such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of
the persons against whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall
be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the
person recovering.
The comparative fault principles of the act were held applicable to strict liability
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ing the question of defective design from the jury, reversed the judgment in favor of Muskin, and ordered a new trial.2" The supreme
court granted certification 2 9 and affirmed the appellate court's decision. 3° It held that the trial judge should have allowed the jury to
determine whether the risks posed by the pool's dimensions and the
slipperiness of its bottom so outweighed its utility as to constitute a
defect. 3 ' The court also held that evidence of the state-of-the-art3 2 at
the time of manufacture could be considered by the jury in its riskutility analysis. 3
The law of products liability in New Jersey has developed out of
the court's rejection of theories of recovery limited by contract and
negligence principles.3 4 In its landmark decision in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.

the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to give

effect to a manufacturer's disclaimer of liability, which was based on
actions in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 160-64, 406 A.2d 140,
145-47 (1979).
27 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 176-77, 463 A.2d at 302. The trial occurred prior to the court's
decision in Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980), which mandated the
use of an "ultimate outcome" charge advising the jury of the effect of its allocation of
fault upon the plaintiffs right to recover. Roman, 82 N.J. at 345, 413 A.2d at 327. The
appellate division ordered that the charge be given at the new trial. O'Brien, 94 N.J. at
177, 463 A.2d at 302. In ordering a new trial, however, the supreme court neither endorsed nor rejected this directive. Id at 188, 463 A.2d at 307-08. The court's silence is
significant in light of the Roman court's recognition of a trial judge's discretion to withhold the charge "in a complex case involving multiple issues and numerous parties."
Roman, 82 N.J. at 346-47, 413 A.2d at 327. Roman involved a negligence action arising
out of a highway accident. d at 340, 413 A.2d at 324. Thus, the O'Brten court's silence
leaves unanswered important questions regarding the charge's applicability in a products liability case.
28 O'Bren, 94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302.
29 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 91 N.J. 548, 453 A.2d 866 (1982).
30 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302. The court modified the appellate court's
order by reinstating the voluntary dismissal of the claims against Kiddie City. See supra
note 14.
31 O'Brzin, 94 N.J. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306.
32 The state-of-the-art refers to "the existing level of technological expertise and scientific knowledge relevant to a particular industry at the time a product is designed."
d. at 182, 463 A.2d at 305 (citing Robb, A PracticalApproach to Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liabi'ty Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 4-5 & n.15 (1982)). The
state-of-the-art is not limited to the custom in a particular industry. Id at 182, 463 A.2d
at 305.
33 Id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 305. The New Jersey Supreme Court first employed a riskutility analysis in a strict products liability case in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76
N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,
447 A.2d 539 (1982); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d
140 (1979).
34 See in/ra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2,
at 593-96 (outlining inadequacies of traditional contract and negligence-based theories
of recovery).
35 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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the absence of contractual privity with the injured consumer.3 6 The
court held that an implied warranty of reasonable safety accompanied every product into the stream of trade, extending directly from
manufacturers and sellers to all those who might reasonably be expected to use the product. 37 The court reasoned that the modern
system of distribution, built upon sales by intermediaries, deprived
consumers of the opportunity to deal directly with those responsible
for product safety and thus removed the traditional protections afforded by the law of contracts. 38 According to the court, those who
were in a position either to control the danger or to distribute equitably any losses that might occur should bear the costs of physical injuries suffered through the use of defective products.3 9
In Santor v. A & M Karagheus'an, Inc.,4° the supreme court expanded on the principles announced in Hennzngsen by holding that
breach of an implied warranty of reasonable fitness gave rise to a
cause of action against the manufacturer for economic as well as
physical injuries." In Santor, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer and
the distributor to recover the cost of defective carpeting."2 The court
rejected the manufacturer's contention that the policy rationale sup36 Id at 413, 161 A.2d at 99-100. In Henningsen, the plaintiff's husband purchased an
automobile from a retailer. Id at 364, 161 A.2d at 73. The plaintiff herself had no
contractual relationship with either the dealer or the manufacturer. Id at 365, 161 A.2d
at 73. Retention of the privity requirement would have absolved those in the chain of
distribution of any responsibility for Mrs. Henningsen's injuries. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 24, § 96. Such a restriction had previously been rejected by the New York Court of
Appeals. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 385, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916) (manufacturer's duty to buyer injured as a result of defects arises from foreseeability of injury, not from contract of sale, and therefore purchaser able to sue manufacturer directly).
37 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 413-14, 161 A.2d at 99-100. The court explained its blending of warranty and tort theories with the observation that warranty actions, historically, had been brought in tort and were based on deceit. Id at 414, 161 A.2d at 100.
38 Id at 379, 161 A.2d at 81. The court contrasted the terms "buyer" and "consumer" to illustrate the features that differentiated the traditional from the modern marketplace. "Buyer" connoted one who met face to face with his seller on equal terms to
purchase products that were relatively simple and of a readily discernible quality. A
"consumer," on the other hand, implied the object of mass advertising campaigns in
which manufacturers cultivated a demand for their products but avoided contact with
the ultimate consumer through the employment of intermediaries. In the court's view,
retention of the privity requirement under modern market conditions would unjustly
insulate manufacturers from liability for consumer injuries. Id.
39 Id Thus the court, in its first modern products liability case, identified the dual
purposes of products liability, that of encouraging manufacturers to market safe products and that of equitably distributing the losses suffered through the use of unsafe products. See id.
40 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
41 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
42 Id. at 55, 207 A.2d at 306.
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porting the abandonment of the privity requirement in cases involving personal injuries did not apply where economic losses alone were
claimed.43 The court stated that it could perceive no reason why the
warranty that attached upon delivery of the article into the commercial stream should be actionable in the one instance and not the
other."
Although the Santor court grounded its decision upon an implied
warranty of merchantability, it went on to adopt the doctrine of
strict liability in tort as the preferred means of measuring a manufacturer's liability for consumer injuries.4 5 The court held that an implicit representation of suitability and safety arose, as a matter of
law, out of a product's presence on the market.4 6 A product that did
not meet this legal standard was considered defective, and its manufacturer would be responsible for all resulting injuries, irrespective of
any showing of negligence or lack of care in the manufacturing
process.4 7
Despite its preference for tort-based theories of liability, the
court relied upon traditional warranty language in defining product
defects." By contrast, the definition adopted by the drafters of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts employed the negligence
terms "unreasonably dangerous."4 9 In the period immediately fol43 Id at 57-59, 207 A.2d at 307-08.
44 Id at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
45 Id at 63-67, 207 A.2d at 311-13. The California Supreme Court rejected such an

expansive application of strict liability in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), and held that the doctrine was inapplicable to cases
involving only economic losses. In a subsequent decision the New Jersey court acknowledged California's rejection of Santor but expressly declined to reexamine its holding in
that case. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 141-42, 238 A.2d 169, 175
(1968) (asserting cause of action for physical damage to property).
46 Santor,44 N.J. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. The significance of the court's holding
lies in its recognition of a legal duty in tort running from the manufacturer to product
users. The court thus established a theory of liability which was not dependent upon
contract and warranty principles.
47 Id at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 312.
48 Id, 207 A.2d at 313. Although the Santorcourt expressly declined to adopt an allencompassing definition of the term "defect," it nonetheless made clear that products
that were "not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold
and used" would be considered defective. Id This language is almost identical to that
used by the Hennigsen court to describe an implied warranty of merchantability. See
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 370, 161 A.2d at 76.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The section provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
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lowing Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court apparently considered
as unimportant the semantic differences between these two definitions.5 ° Ultimately, however, in Cepeda v. CumberlandEngzneering Co.,

'

the court, confronted with a case requiring the formulation of a
working test for product defects, specifically adopted the Restatement
standard.52
In Cepeda, the court determined that a manufacturer could be
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id In the comments following this section, the authors stressed the differences between
strict liability and warranty-based liability. Id § 402A comment m.
50 In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 305, 326 (1965), the
court held that a homeowner could recover damages from a builder under implied warranty or strict liability principles where a design feature of his home proves to be both
"unreasonably dangerous" and the proximate cause of his injury. The court's use of the
"unreasonably dangerous" terminology parallelled, without reference, the "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" standard set out in section 402A of the Restatement.
Schipper was decided two days after Santor, and the court apparently did not perceive any
conflict between the warranty-based and the tort-based terminology employed in those
decisions.
Similarly, in Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410-11, 290 A.2d 281, 285
(1972), the court again employed a test for defect based on "an unreasonable risk of
harm," which was derived independent of its consideration of section 402A. In Bexzga,
the plaintiff was injured while operating a punch press that had been delivered by the
manufacturer without safety devices. Id. at 405, 290 A.2d at 282. The manufacturer
claimed that it was the custom of the trade for such devices to be installed by the ultimate purchasers. Id. at 406-07, 290 A.2d at 283. The supreme court held that where an
unreasonable risk is presented by a machine without protective devices a "jury may infer
that the machine was defective in design unless it finds that the incorporation by the
manufacturer of a safety device would render the machine unusable for its intended
purposes." Id at 410-11, 290 A.2d at 285.
51 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
52 Id at 179-80, 386 A.2d at 829. Prior to Cepeda the courts of California and Alaska
had expressly rejected the Restatement formulation. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
2d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Butaud v. Surburban
Marine Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975). The Cronin court interpreted
the RESTATEMENT as requiring both a showing that the product was defective and that
the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501
P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The court held this dual requirement was unduly
burdensome and inconsistent with its decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.
Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), which had required that
strict liability be founded upon a "defect" but had not defined that term. Cronon, 8 Cal.
3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. Although that position was adopted
by a New Jersey court in Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601, 304 A.2d
562, 564 (Law Div. 1973), the Cepeda court subsequently rejected it. Cepeda, 76 N.J. at
179-80, 386 A.2d at 829.
In Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), the California court, while adhering to Cronin's rejection of the Restatement language, modified its position with regard to leaving defect undefined, and established a
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held liable for injuries sustained by an industrial worker who operated a machine with its safety guard removed.5 3 Focusing on the
manufacturer's ability to foresee such operation, the court reasoned
that distribution of the machine without additional safety devices
could render it defective and unreasonably dangerous. 54 The court
concluded that the actual determination of the existence of the alleged design defect was to be made first by assuming that the manufacturer had knowledge of the danger and then by inquiring
whether, given such knowledge, it had been negligent in placing the
product on the market.55 The manufacturer's actions thus were to be
two-pronged test for evaluating alleged design defects. In presenting these alternative
means of establishing a design defect the court provided that
a court may properly instruct a jury that a product is defective in design if
(1) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the
relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The California
interpretation, minus the Barker test, was ultimately adopted by the New Jersey court in
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 174-76, 406 A.2d 140, 152-53
(1979), which overruled Cepeda's use of the Restatement formula.
53 Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 163-64, 386 A.2d at 821. The plaintiff was injured when his
fingers were caught in the blades of a pelletizing machine which he had been operating
with its finger guard removed. Id at 164-65, 386 A.2d at 822. The guard was easily
removed, and the plaintiffs expert testified that a mechanism to prevent operation of
the machine without the guard was necessary to make the machine safe. Id at 166-67,
386 A.2d at 823. The appellate division held that, as a matter of law, the machine had
been delivered free of defects. Id at 162, 386 A.2d at 821. The supreme court reversed
and held that a jury question as to the defectiveness of the pelletizer had been established. Id. at 181-82, 386 A.2d at 830-31.
54 Id at 176-78, 386 A.2d at 828-29. In applying the Restatement standard the court
required that the product be both defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id at 179, 386
A.2d at 829. The court, however, noted a distinction between design and manufacturing defects and held open the possibility that if confronted with a case involving the
latter it might dispense with the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement. Id.
55 Id at 172-73, 386 A.2d at 825-26 (citing Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liablh'ty
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973)). Both Dean Wade and Dean Keeton have
proposed tests for evaluating a manufacturer's conduct. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 619
n. 125. At least one commentator has noted a distinction between the degrees of knowledge to be imputed to the manufacturer under the Wade and Keeton analyses. Under
the Wade formulation, Professor Birnbaum observes, a manufacturer's conduct in marketing a product is evaluated in light of the dangers which are shown to have existed at
the time of manufacture. Id This analysis implies that a manufacturer would not be
strictly liable for injuries resulting from user exposure to dangers which were unknowable at the time of manufacture. Id. at 622-27. Professor Birnbaum notes that the Keeton "hindsight analysis," however, imputes knowledge of the dangers that are shown to
exist at the time of trial. Thus, a manufacturer's decision to market a particular product
may be deemed unreasonable on the basis of dangers that manifest themselves after the
decision has been made. Id; see also Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabiliy: The Meaning of "De-
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viewed in terms of "whether the magnitude of the risk created by the
dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social
utility attained by putting it out in this fashion." '56 A manufacturer
would be deemed to have acted unreasonably, and the product
found to be defective, if its utility did not outweigh the risks engendered by its use.57
Under Cepeda, risk-utility determinations were to be made on
two levels.58 Initially, the trial courts were to determine whether the
manufacturer's liability was precluded as a matter of law. 59 This determination was based on the court's consideration of seven risk-utility factors, which included the product's usefulness, the likelihood
and seriousness of injury, the availability of an alternative product,
the user's ability to avoid the danger, and the manufacturer's ability
to distribute losses through insurance and price setting.' If after balancing these factors the court determined that liability was not prefect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20

SYRACUSE

L.

REV.

559, 570-71 (1969)

(distinction between knowable and unknowable risks rejected). The Cepeda court, although citing both formulations with approval, endorsed the Keeton approach. Cepeda,
76 N.J. 172, 386 A.2d at 825; see Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 622-23. The court reiterated
this position in subsequent decisions without acknowledging any distinction between the
two approaches. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 200, 477 A.2d
539, 544 (1982); Freund v. Cello Film Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 239-41, 432 A.2d 925,
930-31 (1981); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 171, 406 A.2d
140, 150 (1979). In Beshada the court expressly rejected any limitation of liability based
upon the scientific unknowability of a particular hazard at the time of manufacture.
Beshada, 90 NJ. at 200 n.3, 447 A.2d at 544 n.3.
56 Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 826 (quoting Wade, supra note 55, at 834-35).
57 Id at 173, 386 A.2d at 826.
58 Id at 173-75, 386 A.2d at 826-28.
59 Id. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27.
60 Id. The seven factors were first set forth by Dean Wade. Wade, supra note 55, at
837-38. They are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings
and instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
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cluded, the case would be submitted to the jury.6 In that instance,
the jury was to be instructed to determine whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer, having knowledge of a product's dangerous
propensities, would have placed it on the market.6 2 The Cepeda court
noted that this charge could be supplemented by advising the jury to
consider those risk-utility factors for which there was specific proof or
special significance in a case.63
Just one year after it decided Cepeda, the court reversed its position in Suter v. San Angelo Foundrg and Machzne Co. 64 In that case, it
replaced the Restatement definition of defect with one which focused
on whether the product was "reasonably fit, suitable and safe" for its
intended or foreseeable uses. 65 The court held that a defect could be
established by showing either that the product had failed to live up
to the user's reasonable expectations of safety 66 or that the manufacturer had been negligent in marketing the product. 67 Trial courts
considering claims based on allegedly improper marketing decisions
were directed to employ the Cepeda risk-utility formulation. 68 The
Suter court, however, further distinguished the functions of judge and
jury in determining whether a defect existed.6 9 Based upon its conCepeda, 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
Id.
63 Id at 174-75, 386 A.2d at 827. The court remarked that "it would not always be
appropriate for the court to include in the instructions to the jury all seven of the factors
mentioned." Id at 174, 386 A.2d at 827. Dean Wade suggests that the jury should
normally not be told of the risk-utility factors. Wade, supra note 55, at 840.
64 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
65 Id at 177, 406 A.2d at 153. Justice Clifford, joined by Justices Mountain and
61

62

Sullivan, dissented from the court's rejection of the Restatement standard in a sharply
worded concurring opinion. Id at 178-92, 406 A.2d at 154-61 (Clifford, J., concurring).
The concurrence felt that the majority's mixing of warranty concepts and negligence
terminology was particularly unsuited to this type of tort action. Id.at 179, 406 A.2d at
154 (Clifford, J., concurring).
66 Id.at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150; see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) ("consumer expectations" test one means of proving
design defect); supra note 52 (discussing Barker). This standard is used when "it is selfevident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it
was built.' " Suter, 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962)).
The concurrence rejected the majority's adoption of the so-called "consumer expectations" test for design defects. Id at 190, 406 A.2d at 160 (Clifford, J., concurring). The
Cepeda court also had rejected this test as the sole means of evaluating design defects
based on its observation that in the usual case the ordinary consumer would have no
idea how safely a product could be designed. Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 176, 386 A.2d at 828.
67 Suler, 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150.
68 Id at 171-73, 406 A.2d at 150-51.
69 Id at 172-73, 406 A.2d at 151. The court observed that "[although the considerations for the jury are somewhat comparable to those of the trial court, their decisional
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sideration of the seven risk-utility factors, a trial court was directed in
Suter to determine whether a manufacturer owed a duty to consumers
beyond the exercise of reasonable care in the design process.7 ° If that
duty was found to exist then the case was to be submitted to the jury,
which was instructed to follow the general charge authorized in
fit, suitable and safe" standard
Cepeda, substituting the "reasonably
7t
for that of the Restatemen.
Subsequent to Suter, the court applied its strict liability principles in a case involving allegedly inadequate warnings. In Freund v.
Celloflm Properties, Inc.,72 the trial court had refused to give a strict
liability charge on the question of allegedly defective warnings that
were provided with the product. 73 That court had held that an inadequate warning was the result of the manufacturer's conduct and
that, therefore, the only relevant inquiry concerned the manufacturer's exercise of proper care in choosing the warning.7 4 In reversing, the supreme court focused its attention on the product.7 5 The
court reasoned that the relevant inquiry concerned the reasonableness of the manufacturer's decision to market its product. 76 That decision was to be evaluated first by assuming that the manufacturer
had knowledge of the dangers posed by the product, and then by
functions differ. The court decides what protection should be given and the jury is concerned with reaching a just result as between the parties." Id at 173, 406 A.2d at 151.
70 Id
While the Cepeda court had spoken in terms of an initial determination as to
whether liability ought to be precluded as a matter of law, in Suter the court said that "it
is the function of the court to decide whether the manufacturer has the duty and the
obligation imposed by the strict liability principle." Id at 172, 406 A.2d at 151. Compare
Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 173, 386 A.2d at 826 with Suter, 81 N.J. at 172, 406 A.2d at 151. The
"principle of strict liability" was defined in the following terms:
If at the time the seller distributes a product, it is not reasonably fit, suitable
and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes so that users or
others who may be expected to come into contact with the product are injured as a result thereof, then the seller shall be responsible for the ensuing
damages.
Suter, 81 N.J. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149. Because the law presumed knowledge of a product's dangerous propensities, the duty imposed by this principle requires more than the
exercise of reasonable care in the design and manufacturing processes. Id at 171, 406
A.2d at 150. Thus, under the Suter formulation, trial courts were instructed to make a
policy determination, based on the seven risk-utility factors, as to the applicability of this
enhanced duty prior to submitting the case to the jury. Id at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
71 Suter, 81 N.J. at 176-77, 406 A.2d at 153. The jury would be charged only as to
those specific risk-utility factors considered pertinent to a particular case. Id at 176, 406
A.2d at 153.
72 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
73 Id
at 236, 432 A.2d at 928-29. The appellate division had affirmed the trial
court's refusal to give the requested charge. Id
74 Id.at 235-36, 432 A.2d at 928-29.
75 Id.at 236-40, 432 A.2d at 929-31.
76 Id
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asking whether a reasonable manufacturer with such knowledge
would have delivered the product into the commercial stream without warning of those dangers." Consequently, a manufacturer
would be held strictly liable for its failure to incorporate adequate
warnings into the product's design.7 8
The court applied this product-oriented analysis in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.79 and abolished the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability cases involving allegedly inadequate warnings." In Beshada, former plantworkers and their survivors alleged
injurious exposure to asbestos during the course of their employment
at various industrial sites. 8 One of the plaintiffs' claims rested on the
failure of manufacturers and distributors to warn of the dangers inherent in the use of asbestos or products that contained asbestos.8 2 In
response, the defendants asserted that the dangers were not scientifically cognizable at the time of manufacture.8 3 On the plaintiffs' motion to strike this defense, the defendants argued that the knowledge
imputed to the seller of a product under Freund was limited to that
either in existence or technologically available at the time of manufacture.84 The trial court ruled that Freundmerely raised a presumption of knowledge which could be rebutted by proof that the dangers
were "unknowable" when the product was manufactured. 8 5 The
supreme court, after noting that a defendant's knowledge of the danger was irrelevant for strict liability purposes,8 6 reversed and held
that the state-of-the-art was essentially a negligence defense that was
inapplicable in warnings cases.8 7
The Beshada court adopted a two-step analysis of product
77 Id. The court noted that under a risk-utility analysis a manufacturer, deemed to
know of his product's dangers, could almost always make his product safe by providing a
warning that would not detract from its utility. Id at 238 n. 1, 432 A.2d at 930 n. 1. The
court maintained that a products liability jury charge must focus on the safety features
of product warnings. Id at 242-43, 432 A.2d at 932. Thus, the court concluded that "it
must be explained that an adequate warning is one that includes the directions, communications and information essential to make the use of a product safe." Id at 243, 432
A.2d at 932.
78 Id.
79 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
80 Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549; see supra note 32.
81 Beshada, 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
82 Id. at 196-97, 447 A.2d at 542-43.

83 Id
84

Id. at 198-99, 447 A.2d at 543.

85 Id at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.

Id. at 200 n.3, 447 A.2d at 544 n.3.
Id at 204, 447 A.2d at 546. The court specifically limited its holding to warnings
cases and declined to examine the defense's applicability in a case involving an allegedly
defective safety device. Id at 203 n.6, 447 A.2d at 546 n.6.
86
87
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safety."8 First, a product was to be evaluated to determine whether
its utility outweighed the risks engendered by its use.8 9 Where this
was found to be the case, the focus shifted to whether the risks had
been "reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
product's utility."9 0 The court reasoned that a defendant could always reduce the risk of harm by providing a warning and, because he
was deemed to have knowledge of the danger, his failure to do so
would render the product defective. 9 ' The court acknowledged that
its rationale sanctioned the imposition of liability for failure to warn
against dangers that could not have been scientifically discovered at
the time of manufacture.9 2 To support this result, the court invoked
the public policies underlying strict liability, relying primarily on 9the
3
manufacturer's presumed ability to spread the cost of accidents.
In O'Brien, which was decided slightly more than a year after
Beshada, the court again endorsed the public policies supporting strict
liability in design defect cases. 94 Foremost among those policies were
the desire to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof and the need to insure that manufacturers act responsibly in marketing their products. 95 In the court's opinion, elimination of the requirement that an
injured consumer establish a manufacturer's negligence was the most
effective means of easing the plaintiffs burden.9 6 Accordingly, the
court reiterated its position that a consumer need only prove that
at 201, 447 A.2d at 544-45.
89 Id, 447 A.2d at 545.
90 Id In a footnote, the court asserted that this dichotomy was created for analytical
purposes only and that "the only test for product safety is whether the benefit outweighs
88 Id

the risk." Id at 201 n.4, 447 A.2d at 545 n.4.
91 Id at 201-02, 447 A.2d at 545.
92 Id at 204-05, 447 A.2d at 546-47.
93 Id at 205-09, 447 A.2d at 547-48. The court concluded that manufacturers were
in a better position than injured consumers to spread the costs of unforeseeable accidents
and that the imposition of liability would spur industry efforts to design safer products.
d at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48. Additionally, the court found that the fact-finding
process would be greatly simplified by eliminating "complicated, costly, confusing and
time-consuming" state-of-the-art proofs. Id at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
94 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 179-80, 463 A.2d at 303.
95 Id; see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
96 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 179, 463 A.2d at 303. Dean Wade has observed that, in a
negligence action, the plaintiff must show not only the product's dangerous condition
but also that the defendant was "negligent in letting the product get into that dangerous
condition, or in failing to discover the condition and take reasonable action to eliminate
it as well." Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionabil'y, 33 VAND. L. REV.,
551, 552 (1980). The primary difficulty in proving such negligence arises out of the
injured consumer's unfamiliarity with the manufacturing process itself. See Birnbaum,
supranote 2, at 595-96 (citing Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)); see also Wade, supra note 55, at 825-26 (proving negligence by manufacturer or supplier often difficult or impossible).
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"(1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect caused injury
to a reasonably foreseeable user." 97 By preserving the requirement
that a product be proven defective before imposing liability, the
court sought both to distinguish between strict and absolute liability
and to rebut contentions that its9 8 formulation made manufacturers
insurers of their products' safety.
Although rejecting negligence proofs as an element of a plaintiff's case, the court employed the negligence principles of duty and
foreseeability in conceptualizing a manufacturer's iesponsibility to
the public.99 The court ascertained a general duty running from a
manufacturer to the foreseeable users of its products, which comprises both the duty to warn against inherent dangers and the duty
to refrain from marketing unsafe products.'t ° Predicating liability on
a breach of this general duty, the court determined that, in marketing a product, "a manufacturer assumes responsibility to members of
the public who are injured because of defects in that product."' 0 '
In determining whether a manufacturer had breached its duty
to a consumer, the court focused on the product.10 2 Thus, it considered the release of a defective product into the stream of trade, rather
than the manufacturer's lack of care in the design or manufacturing
process, to be the breach necessary to trigger strict liability."0 3 The
promulgation of a standard against which alleged product defects
could be evaluated, therefore, constituted the central feature of the
court's analysis. "
Initially, the O'Brien court recognized a basic distinction between manufacturing flaws and design defects and discussed the
97 O'Brzen, 94 N.J. at 179, 463 A.2d at 303 (citing Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem.
Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982)).
98 Id at 179-80, 463 A.2d at 303. In his dissent, Justice Schreiber argued that the
majority's test for determining when a defect exists was so broad that it amounted to an
imposition of absolute liability. Id. at 198, 463 A.2d at 313-14 (Schreiber, J., concurring
and dissenting); see tnfra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
99 O'Bnin, 94 N.J. at 180, 463 A.2d at 303.

100 Id

1ol Id
102 Id
103 Id The court noted that even if a product is carefully produced, the manufacturer
will be liable for any injuries resulting from product defects. Id
104 Id, 463 A.2d at 303-04. The court recognized that "[t]he term is not self-defining
and has no accepted meaning suitable for all strict liability cases. Implicit in the term
'defect' is a comparison of the product with a standard of evaluation; something can be
defective only if.it fails to measure up to that standard." Id at 180-81, 463 A.2d at 304.
The court's analysis, therefore, focused more on developing a means of identifying defective products than on defining the term.
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standards of evaluation applicable in each case."°5 Where manufacturing defects are alleged, the court noted, the proper inquiry is
whether the product was produced in conformity with the manufacturer's intentions. 10 6 In contrast, the court found much subtler considerations implicated in cases involving design defects" 7 and
endorsed the use of two tests to determine whether a product is so
dangerous that it "create[s] a risk of harm outweighing [its]
usefulness." 08
The first test, which requires implementation of a risk-utility
analysis, was considered appropriate in cases in which a product's
design renders it safe for use in some situations but unsafe in
others.'0 9 The court viewed the second test, a "consumer expectations test," as an alternative standard to be applied when a product
has failed to live up to the user's reasonable expectations of safety."o
Because Muskin's pool "fulfilled its function as a place for swim' 1" but apparently presented a risk of injury when used for divming""
ing, the O'Brien court applied the risk-utility test to the alleged
defect." 12

In endorsing the continued use of the risk-utility factors first employed in Cepeda," 3 the court considered the state-of-the-art at the
time of manufacture to be relevant to the evaluation of product defects.'
Accordingly, it directed that "risks that the manufacturer
knew or should have known would be posed by the product, as well
as the adequacy of any warnings""' 5 be weighed against the need for
105 Id at 180-82, 463 A.2d at 303. This same distinction was drawn by the court in
Cepeda. Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824; see also Suter, 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d
at 150 (describing various tests applicable in design and manufacturing cases). Dean
Keeton has suggested limiting use of the term "defect" to those cases involving manufacturing flaws. Keeton, supra note 55, at 562. He would substitute the term "dangerously
designed" for "defectively designed." d at 565-67; see also Wade, supra note 55, at 83132 ("defect" limited in natural application to flaw in manufacturing process).
106 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304.
107 Id. Design defects were defined to include any feature of the product's design "including the absence or inadequacy of warnings." Id
108 Id at 181-82, 463 A.2d at 304.
1o9 Id; see infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
110 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 182, 463 A.2d at 304. Justice Clifford dissented from the court's
endorsement of the "consumer expectations test." d at 188, 463 A.2d at 308 (Clifford,
J., concurring). In his view, the test unduly limited consumer recovery. Id; see infra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
M11O'Brzen, 94 N.J. at 182, 463 A.2d at 304.
112 Id
113 See Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 176, 386 A.2d at 305; supra notes 53-63 and accompanying

text.
114 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 182-84, 463 A.2d at 305; see supra note 32 and accompanying

text.
115 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305.
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a particular product, in light of available and safer design alternatives."6 Although the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a
product's risks outweigh its benefits, the court held that the defendant "must prove that compliance with the state-of-the-art, in conjunction with other relevant evidence, justifies placing a product on the market."'' 7 Hence, under the court's risk-utility analysis, proof of
compliance with the state-of-the-art, while relevant, does not exculpate the defendant." 8
The majority concluded that it was not necessary for a plaintiff
to prove the existence of an available design alternative in order to
make out a prima facie case." 9 Rather, he need only "adduce sufficient evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect."'' 20 In
the case of above-ground pools, the court suggested that a plaintiff
might seek to establish their recreational rather than therapeutic nature, the likelihood of injury due to their configuration, the insufficiency of the warnings, the use of vinyl as a liner, and the relative
ease with which prominent warnings and a less dangerous liner could
be provided.' 2 ' Ultimately, it determined, if reasonable minds could
conclude that the risk of injury outweighed the pool's utility, the
1 22
question of defect must be resolved by a jury.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clifford addressed both the
majority's tests for design defects and the difficulties that he found to
be inherent in each. 123 While flatly rejecting the "consumer expectations" test,' 24 he accepted, with reservations, the majority's use of the
risk-utility test. 1 5 In Justice Clifford's view, the consumer's lack of
116 Id The majority, however, held that a plaintiff did not have to establish the existence of an available design alternative to make out a prima facie case on the issue of
defect. Id at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306; see nifra
notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
117 O'Bren, 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added). The practical effect of
this dichotomization of proofs may be to shift the burden to the defendant upon the
plaintiff's proof of a product-related injury. See in/ia notes 180-83 and accompanying
text.
118 O'Bren, 94 N.J. at 183-84, 463 A.2d at 305. The majority was of the opinion that a
product manufactured in conformity with the state-of-the-art might "still fail to satisfy
the risk-utility equation." Id.at 184, 463 A.2d at 305.
''9 Id. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306.
120 Id at 185, 463 A.2d at 306.
121 Id
122 Id.The court determined that even if no alternative methods of making pool bottoms existed, a jury might still find that the risks posed by pools with vinyl liners outweighed any utility gained by placing them on the market. Id
123 Id.at 188-92, 463 A.2d at 308-10 (Clifford, J., concurring).
124 Id at 188, 463 A.2d at 308 (Clifford, J., concurring).
125 Id Justice Clifford reasoned that state-of-the-art evidence "is implicitly included
in the factors employed in the risk/utility analysis adopted in Cepeda." Id at 189, 463
A.2d at 308 (Clifford, J., concurring). Accordingly, he felt that the majority's reaffirma-
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information regarding product design prevents him from developing
a reasonable expectation of safety. 126 He believed, therefore, that the
only true test for design defects should be based on the Cepeda riskutility analysis. 127
Justice Clifford expressed his concern over the continued effect
upon trial courts of the distinction drawn in Suter between the decisional functions of judge and jury in risk-utility analysis. 128 Noting
the inconsistent treatment of those functions in the model jury
charges used by the state's judges, the concurrence rejected the Suter
court's assertion that the jury was not to undertake a risk-utility anal3
ysis. 29 While the majority also rejected that view, ' Justice Clifford
concluded that a return to the language of the charge endorsed in
Cepeda would both simplify the tasks of judge and jury and bring
stability to the law of products liability. 131
Justice Schreiber, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, expressed his belief that the majority had crossed the line separating
strict from absolute liability. 132 He reasoned that the majority's imposition of liability where no design alternative existed amounted to
an imposition of liability in the absence of a defect. 33 In his view,
such liability was absolute and required the making of policy choices
which juries are institutionally incapable of making. 34 He contion of the Cepeda formulation did nothing to advance the "exotic theory" presented in
Beshada. Id
126 Id at 188, 463 A.2d at 308 (Clifford, J., concurring). Rather than expand on his
reasons for rejecting this test, Justice Clifford adopted by reference the views expressed
in his concurrence in Suter. Id (citing Suter, 81 N.J. at 190, 406 A.2d at 160). In that
opinion he espoused the view that the test failed to protect those whose use of the product, although foreseeable, was not a use for which the product had been designed. Suter,
81 N.J. at 190, 406 A.2d at 160.
127 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 189-90, 463 A.2d at 308-09 (Clifford, J., concurring).
128 Id at 190-92, 463 A.2d at 309-10 (Clifford, J., concurring). The Suter court had
reasoned that "[ajlthough the considerations for the jury are somewhat comparable to
those of the trial court, their decisional functions differ. The court decides what protection should be given and the jury is concerned with reaching a just result between the
parties." Suter, 81 N.J. at 173, 406 A.2d at 151.
129 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 191-92, 463 A.2d at 309-10 (Clifford, J., concurring).
130 Id at 187, 463 A.2d at 307.
131 Id at 192, 463 A.2d at 310 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford observed that
the Cepeda charge, which had utilized the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
standard, could be modified to incorporate the Suter "reasonably fit, suitable and safe"
test for design defects. Id
132 Id at 192, 463 A.2d at 310 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
133 Id at 198-200, 463 A.2d at 315 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
134 Id Justice Schreiber cited the Restatement for the proposition that decisions relating
to the applicability of absolute liability to a particular activity are entirely within the
province of the court. Id at 196, 463 A.2d at 312 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment 1 (1965)). Thus, he
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cluded that the majority's delegation to the jury of the risk-utility
analysis has added a new category of defects to the law of products
liability, defects which would be defined only by subjective, unpredictable, and inconsistent determinations regarding the need for and
desirability of a particular product.' 3 5
Justice Schreiber also considered the elements of a plaintiff's
prima facie case, as set forth by the majority, to be so fluid that a jury
would be justified in finding a defect in every case arising out of a
product-related accident. 136 Instead, he would have had the court
clearly delineate the functions of judge and jury, with courts making
initial policy determinations using all seven risk-utility factors and
juries evaluating only those products for which a trial court had determined liability was not precluded as a matter of law. 13 7 In this
way, he would have confined the jury's consideration to those riskutility factors deemed pertinent to a particular case, thus restricting
3
the number of cases in which a defect could be found. 1
The knowledge of product dangers that is imputed to commercial sellers as a matter of law distinguishes strict liability from negligence and other conduct-based theories of producer liability. 139 In
Beshada, the court used a hindsight analysis wherein product sellers
were deemed to have knowledge of those product dangers that were
shown to exist at the time of trial."4° That legal fiction rendered
proof of the state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture inadmissible
because what the manufacturer knew or could have known at that
time was deemed irrelevant for strict liability purposes." ' The
O'Br'en court, therefore, in conceding the relevance of evidence of the
state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture retreated from the exreasoned that a jury should be precluded, in strict liability cases, from imposing such
liability. Id at 196-98, 463 A.2d at 312-13 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
135 Id at 200, 463 A.2d at 315 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Schreiber viewed the majority's formulation as encompassing "not only individual product flaw, improper design and inadequate warning cases, but also a fourth category of
cases in which the jury decides that the risks outweigh the utility of the product." Id.
136 Id
137 Id. at 196-98, 463 A.2d at 312-13 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting); see
supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
138 O'Braen, 94 N.J. at 196-98, 463 A.2d at 312-13 (Schreiber, J., concurring and
dissenting).
139 See Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 619; see also Beshada, 90 N.J. at 203-04, 447 A.2d at
546 (defendant's knowledge irrelevant for strict liability purposes); Freund, 87 N.J. at
236-40, 432 A.2d at 929-31 (manufacturer's assumed knowledge distinguishes strict liability from negligence); Suter, 81 N.J. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150 (knowledge of harmful
propensities assumed in design cases); Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825 (same).
140 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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treme position taken in Beshada. 4 2 More recently, in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,'43 the court abandoned the Beshada rationale and
held that the knowledge to be imputed to a manufacturer in a warnings case is only such knowledge as is available at the time of
manufacture. 144

Despite its recent abandonment of the rule announced in
Beshada, the court has stopped well short of signalling the total abnegation of the assumed knowledge principle. 4 5 In admitting evidence
of a manufacturer's compliance with the state-of-the-art as relevant
to risk-utility considerations, the O'Brien court restored the defense
that was foreclosed in Beshada.'46 The limitations placed on the use
of that defense, however, indicate the court's continued resistance to
suggestions that manufacture in conformity with the state-of-the-art
necessarily renders a product free from defects as a matter of law.' 4 7
Thus, in cases involving design features other than warnings, the
state-of-the-art is treated merely as one of the factors to be considered
by the jury in making its risk-utility determinations.14 8 Under this
See id.
97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
144 Id. at 452, 479 A.2d at 386 (in warnings cases, manufacturer's conduct measured
by knowledge available at time of distribution). The court observed that "[a] warning
that a product may have an unknowable danger warns one of nothing." Id at 455, 479
A.2d at 388. With respect to the specific holding in Beshada, the court asserted that "[i]f
Beshada were deemed to hold generally or in all cases, . . . that in a warning context
knowledge of the unknowable is irrelevant in determining the applicability of strict liability, we would not agree." Id. at 454-55, 479 A.2d at 387. The court, however, did not
overrule Beshada but instead restricted it "to the circumstances giving rise to its holding."
Id. at 455, 479 A.2d at 388.
145 See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
146 Compare O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 182-84,. 463 A.2d at 305 (state-of-the-art relevant to
risk-utility analysis) with Beshada, 90 N.J. at 202-08, 447 A.2d at 449-54 (state-of-the-art
proofs irrelevant in strict liability action). In characterizing the majority's treatment of
the state-of-the-art, Justice Clifford recognized that the court could "scarcely be more
unambiguous in pointing out that state-of-the-art evidence is just one type of proof that
may be relevant on the central issue of defect." O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 189, 463 A.2d at 308
(Clifford, J., concurring).
147 Justice Schreiber was of the opinion that there could be no defect in design unless
there was "an alternative, technologically feasible design available at the time the product was designed." O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 193, 463 A.2d at 311 (Schreiber, J., concurring
and dissenting).
148 Id at 183-84, 463 A.2d at 305. The majority in O'Brienheld that a defendant must
prove that compliance with the state-of-the-art, together with "other relevant evidence,"
justifies the product's presence on the market. Id Thus, the court felt that some products are "so dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis" their
presence on the market can not be justified even when manufactured in conformity with
the state-of-the-art. Id at 184, 463 A.2d at 305. This aspect of the court's analysis was
soundly criticized by Justice Schreiber. Id at 198, 463 A.2d at 313-14 (Schreiber, J.,
concurring and dissenting). It is unclear, however, whether this aspect of O'Brien survives Feldman where the adequacy of the warnings are challenged. In Feldman, there was
142

143
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view, a plaintiff is not obliged to prove the existence of an available
and safer design alternative in order to make out a prima facie case
of defective design. 4 9
The O'Brien court's treatment of the state-of-the-art defense
clashes with the reasonably prudent manufacturer standard it endorses. By holding open the possibility that a product will be found
defective where there is no available design alternative, the court
sanctions liability where a manufacturer's decision to market its
product should be considered reasonable. Where the inherent dangers posed by a product are known but there exists no technologically
feasible way to eliminate the risks through alternate design, the focus
shifts from the admittedly dangerous design features to the warnings
that accompany the product.' 5 ° Thus, an otherwise dangerous product may be rendered safe by providing a warning "sufficient to protect any and all foreseeable users from [the] dangers presented."'' A
manufacturer who provides a warning sufficient to protect the user
from all known or knowable dangers can be found to have acted unreasonably only if he is held to a standard of conduct measured by
no proof that the product was improperly designed. Feldman, 97 N.J. at 449, 479 A.2d at
385. Similarly, no claim was made that the product was so dangerous that it created a
risk of harm outweighing its usefulness. Id at 446 n.5, 479 A.2d at 383 n.5. In this
context, the court required a manufacturer to provide warnings against dangers that it
knew or should have known existed at the time of distribution. Id. at 458, 479 A.2d at
389. Under these circumstances, therefore, proof that the warning conformed to the
state-of-the-art would constitute an absolute defense. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this result will be confined to warnings cases alone or whether Justice Schreiber's views as to the reasonableness of manufacture in conformity with the state-of-theart will gain ascendancy on the court.
149 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 545-46. Although Beshada dealt with a
manufacturer's "duty to warn" against unknowable dangers, there are no conceptual
differences between that duty and a duty to guard against those dangers through safer
design.
150 Id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (concerning unavoidably unsafe products). Prior to Feldman, the New Jersey
courts had held that comment k exempted drug manufacturers from the duty imposed
by strict liability principles. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d
203 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd., 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984); cf Brody v. Overlook
Hosp., 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (blood transfusion given despite inability to
detect known contaminant). Although the supreme court rejected such an exemption,
Feldman, 97 N.J. at 449, 479 A.2d at 384, it adopted a standard under which "negligence
and strict liability in warning cases may be deemed to be functional equivalents." d at
452, 479 A.2d at 386 (emphasis added). By holding out the possibility that a product
may be defective where it is perfectly manufactured, designed in conformity with the
state-of-the-art, and accompanied by adequate warnings, however, the O'Brien court applied to a design case a stricter standard than would apparently be applied under Feldman to a pure warnings case.
151 Freund,87 N.J. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
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after-acquired knowledge. 152 Such a standard not only renders the
or comstate-of-the-art irrelevant but makes reference to objective
53
mon notions of reasonableness impossible as well.'
Consistent application of the reasonably prudent manufacturer
test would require that products whose design features and warnings
comply with the state-of-the-art be found not defective as a matter of
law.' 5 4 One commentator has suggested the use of a two-step approach when applying the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability
actions.1 55 Under the first of these steps, a manufacturer who affirmatively pleads and proves compliance with the highest level of technology available at the time of manufacture would not be held
strictly liable. 156 His failure to utilize that technology would trigger
an evaluation of those factors that justify nonuse of the higher technology.' 5 7 Thus, the second-step contemplates situations in which a
manufacturer's decision to forego use of the available technology can
be considered reasonable. 58 The factors to be weighed in making
this second-step determination closely parallel the risk-utility factors
employed by the New Jersey courts.' 59 This approach, unlike that
152 See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. Despite its retreat from the Beshada
"hindsight analysis," the O'Brien court's failure to recognize compliance with the stateof-the-art as an absolute defense renders its discussion of "reasonable conduct" unrealistic. By contrast, in Feldman, the court determined that, where warnings alone are challenged, the decision to market should be viewed as reasonable if the warnings conform to
the then existing body of scientific and technical knowledge. See supra notes 152 & 156.
Applying O'Brien and Feldman in tandem, therefore, results in the application of separate
and distinct standards of "reasonableness" in design and warning cases. Given the
court's past practice of treating design and warning cases interchangeably, it is doubtful
whether such a distinction is either useful or desirable. See Feldman, 97 N.J. at 451, 479
A.2d at 385 (defendant's conduct relevant in design or warning cases); O'Brien, 94 N.J. at
181, 463 A.2d at 304 (same).
153 See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 200 n.3, 447 A.2d at 544 n.3. Beshada's reliance on the
"fiction" of assumed knowledge illustrates its incompatibility with a test based on objectively reasonable conduct. Id. In addition, O'Brien's reliance on risk-utility determinations, unbounded by an absolute state-of-the-art defense in design cases, distinguishes
reasonable conduct for strict liability purposes from conduct that an ordinary person
would consider reasonable.
154 See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
155 Robb, supra note 32, at 22-30. This approach is consistent with the reasonably
prudent manufacturer test for design defects.
156 Id
at 20-22. This approach closely parallels that taken by the trial court in
Beshada. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85. In treating the principle of assumed
knowledge as presumptive rather than conclusive, the trial judge, in effect, would have
required the Beshada defendants to prove both the level of scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time of manufacture and the provision of warnings conforming to
that knowledge. See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543. As in the Robb analysis,
such proofs would have exculpated the defendants. Id
157 Robb, supra note 32, at 22-25.
158 id
159 Id at 24; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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taken in O'Brt'en, is founded upon the notion of a "correctable
wrong."' 6 Hence, under this approach, a manufacturer's decision to
market a product can be unreasonable only where a safer one could
have been made.16
Rather than determining, as a matter of law, that a manufacturer acts reasonably when he markets a product which conforms in
design and warning to the state-of-the-art, the O'Brien majority left
the question to the jury.'6 2 The jury must determine whether the
risks presented by such a product outweigh its utility.'6 3 Placing this
determination with the jury raises the possibility that whole product
lines will be declared defective based upon a particular jury's subjective view of society's need for those products."6 The extremely low
threshold established for taking a case to the jury increases the risk of
65
such declarations. 1

By adopting a simple negligence standard to guide the trial
court's initial evaluation of the plaintiff's strict liability proofs, 166 the
majority dispenses with one of the essential features of the risk-utility
analysis implemented in Cepeda'67 and Suter.' 6' The distinct functions
of judge and jury in the risk-utility process have long been recognized. ' 69 Dean Wade, author of the risk-utility standard adopted in
Cepeda, has stated that "[c]ourt control of jury action is more extensive [in strict liability cases] than in the ordinary negligence acRobb, supra note 32, at 30-33.
161 Id; see also Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 645 (liability predicated on faulty conduct
provides incentive to design safer products). In treating compliance with the state-ofthe-art as merely evidential, the O'Briencourt sanctions liability where no safer product
was possible. See supra notes 119-22. Such liability risks transforming strict liability into
a system of no-fault compensation based on proof of injury alone. See Robb, supra note
32, at 30-31.
162 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306.
163 Id at 185, 463 A.2d at 306.
164 See id at 198, 463 A.2d at 314 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting); cf.Wade,
supra note 55, at 838 (decision involves policy questions distinct from factual issues jury
customarily decides).
165 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306 (citing Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2,
5, 258 A.2d 706, 707-08 (1969)). The standard to be applied was "whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. . . the jury might conclude that the
plaintiff had proved the existence of a defect." Id
166 See id This standard was generally applied prior to the court's formal adoption of
the Wade risk-utility formulation in Cepeda. See Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65
N.J. 582, 597, 326 A.2d 673, 681 (1974); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 421,
290 A.2d 286, 291 (1972); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 409, 290 A.2d 281,
284 (1972).
167 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
169 Wade, supra note 55, at 838-39.
160
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tion."'
The policy questions implicated in considering whole
classes of allegedly defective products necessitate such control.' 7 1
Under the court's earlier applications of the risk-utility formula, the
trial courts were instructed to consider each of the seven risk-utility
factors and to make a policy determination as to the applicability or
inapplicability of strict liability. 7 2 Once a decision had been made
to present the case to the jury, a charge including only those riskutility factors especially pertinent to a particular case was to be
73
given. 1
Compounding the difficulties arising from the majority's limitation of the trial judge's function is the cursory treatment accorded by
the court to the elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case.' 7 4 Although the court offered examples of evidence that would be relevant
to the plaintiffs risk-utility case, it provided no realistic standard by
which to gauge the quantum of proof required to create a jury question."' Application of an unqualified negligence test to the plaintiff's proofs will result in decisions to send practically every case
involving a product-related accident to the jury.' 7 6 The only guidance provided to juries by the O'Brien court is its admonition that
1 77
they determine whether a product's risks outweigh its utility.

Currently in use throughout the state are two model jury
charges that are applicable in products liability cases. 1 78 Although
they do not constitute binding authority, these charges are generally
Id at 839.
Id at 838.
172 See supra notes 63-68 & 74-76 and accompanying text.
173 Id.; Wade, supra note 55, at 840.
174 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306. The court stated that "the plaintiff
should adduce sufficient evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect." Id.; see
supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. The court then provided several examples of
the type of evidence that a plaintiff might introduce but concluded that evidence on all
of the alternatives need not be presented. O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306.
175 See O'Bren, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306.
176 See id at 200, 463 A.2d at 315 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting). The
170

'7'

California Supreme Court apparently reached this conclusion in Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). There, the court held that
upon proof that a product's design had proximately caused an injury, the burden shifted
to the defendant to prove that the product was not defective. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431,
573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Thus, under the California formulation, the
plaintiff's prima facie case is made out upon proof of a product-related injury. Given
the expanded role of the jury in the O'Braen risk-utility analysis, proof of such an injury,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would be sufficient to send a
case to the jury. See bnfra note 179 and accompanying text.
177 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 186-87, 463 A.2d at 307.
178 W. DREIR & H. GOLDMANN, supra note 1; MODEL JURY CHARGES, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 5.27 (May 1980).
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consulted by trial judges. 7 9 At present, the charges reflect the balance between the functions of judge and jury struck by the court in
The readjustment of that balance by the O'Bri'en majority
Suter.'
raises serious questions about the present usefulness of the model
charges. 181
The O'Brien court's failure to recommend a specific jury charge
for use in design defect cases will render its approach to the riskutility analysis unwieldy for trial courts. If the trial courts are no
longer to make the policy determinations contemplated in Suter, juries will require some positive guidelines against which to measure
the legal reasonableness of a manufacturer's decision to market its
product. Particularly where the court holds open the possibility that
manufacturers may be deemed to have acted unreasonably in distributing a product that was perfectly manufactured, designed in conformity with the highest available technology, and accompanied by
the most stringent warnings possible, a jury must be provided with
some objective criteria for it to use in evaluating the reasonableness
of the marketing decision.'" 2 In the absence of such guidelines, jury
deliberations may be expected to devolve into philosophical debates
concerning the relative social virtues of a particular product. 8 ' In
light of the court's insistence upon a charge based solely on risk-utilO'Brien, 94 N.J. at 191, 463 A.2d at 310 (Clifford, J., concurring).
180 See W. DREIR & H. GOLDMANN, supra note 1, at 53; MODEL JURY CHARGES,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5.27 ii (May 1980).
181 Compare O'Brzen, 94 N.J. at 185-87, 463 A.2d at 306-07 wzth Suter, 81 N.J. at 173,
406 A.2d at 151 and DREIR & GOLDMANN, supra note 1, at 52 and MODEL JURY
179 See

CHARGES, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

5.27 ii (May 1980).

See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. "Reasonableness" as used by the
court is not bounded by a layman's notion of what would be reasonable. Thus, under
the majority formulation, a manufacturer might still be deemed to have acted unreasonably in marketing the safest, most advanced product possible. See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at
184, 463 A.2d at 306. This hindsight evaluation necessarily involves second-guessing by
jurors who focus to a large extent on their own view of society's need for a particular
product. See Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 632-34. It is precisely this type of evaluation
that is avoided where the trial court plays a policy role in the risk-utility analysis. See
Wade, supra note 55, at 838. Perhaps the most troubling effect of such evaluations is the
uncertainty faced by manufacturers in marketing new products. The standard of "reasonableness" employed provides no basis upon which to evaluate and conform their
conduct at the time of manufacture. See Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 645 (negligence
standard for design defects would provide incentive for manufacturers to market safe
products); Robb, supra note 32, at 30-31 (strict liability retains notion of "correctable
wrongs"). Manufacturers would also be subjected to inconsistent and even contradictory jury verdicts, sending no clear signal of the type of products demanded of them.
183 See Birnbaum, supranote 2, at 632-34. Professor Birnbaum observes that a charge
based merely on invocation of unqualified risk-utility considerations "leaves the trier of
fact to rely on some visceral sense of whether the product was riskier than it was useful."
She also notes that the presence of a seriously injured plaintiff could lead a sympathetic
jury to conclude that a product's risks outweighed its benefits. Id
182
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ity principles, those courts seeking an informed decision would be
well advised to develop a charge incorporating all of the risk-utility
factors and instructing the jury to give reasoned consideration to
each factor.

84

Stephen J. Foley) Jr.
184 But see Wade, supra note 55, at 840. The court's departure from the clearly delineated functions of judge and jury leaves a void in which full consideration of the seven
factors apparently becomes lost. As the court has expressed a preference for jury resolution of the risk-utility question, this determination ought to be made only after reasoned
deliberation based on all of the risk-utility information formerly reserved for the trial
judge.

